The Russo-Ukrainian War is a conflict between Russia (together with pro-Russian rebel groups) and Ukraine that is still continuing. It began in February 2014, following the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, and initially centered on the international recognition of Crimea and the Donbas as part of Ukraine. The Russian annexation of Crimea (2014) and the war in Donbas (2014-present) between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists, as well as naval incidents, cyberwarfare, and political tensions, marked the first eight years of the conflict. Following a Russian military buildup on the Russia-Ukraine border that began in late 2021, the conflict escalated substantially on February 24, 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Pro-Russian unrest developed in regions of Ukraine following the Euromaidan protests and a revolution that resulted in the overthrow of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014. In the Ukrainian area of Crimea, Russian soldiers wearing no insignia took control of critical sites and infrastructure, as well as seizing the Crimean Parliament. Russia held a contentious referendum, with the result that Crimea would join Russia. As a result, Crimea was annexed. Pro-Russian protests in Ukraine’s Donbas region erupted in April 2014 into a war between the Ukrainian military and Russian-backed separatists from the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics.
Unmarked Russian military trucks crossed the border into the Donetsk region in August 2014. On one side, Ukrainian forces clashed with separatists intermingled with Russian troops, while Russia attempted to hide its role on the other. With several failed truce attempts, the war became a static conflict. The Minsk II agreements were signed by Russia and Ukraine in 2015, but they have yet to be completely implemented due to a number of disagreements. By 2019, the Ukrainian government had classed 7% of Ukraine as temporarily occupied areas.
There was a substantial Russian military build-up around Ukraine’s borders in 2021 and early 2022. NATO has accused Russia of plotting an invasion, which the Russian government has rejected. Russian President Vladimir Putin has described NATO’s expansion as a threat to his country, and has urged that Ukraine be prohibited from joining the military alliance. He also espoused Russian irredentist views, questioned Ukraine’s right to exist, and incorrectly claimed that Vladimir Lenin founded Ukraine. Russia recognized the two self-proclaimed separatist governments in the Donbas on February 21, 2022, and openly sent soldiers into the region. Russia attacked Ukraine three days later. Russia has been widely denounced for its actions in post-revolutionary Ukraine, with many accusing it of breaking international law and infringing on Ukrainian sovereignty. Following the 2022 invasion, many countries imposed economic sanctions on Russia, Russian persons, and Russian enterprises.
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Russia has lost how many tanks in Ukraine?
In its invasion of Ukraine, Russia is said to have lost around 650 tanks and approximately 3,000 other armored vehicles and heavy equipment. Experts attribute the losses to modern anti-tank weapons provided by Western countries to Ukraine, bad strategy, low morale, and significant design defects.
Ukraine claims Russia has lost around 1,200 tanks, a figure we are unable to verify. According to the military and intelligence site Oryx, which records Russian military equipment losses in Ukraine based on photos received from the front lines, Russia has lost 664 tanks and about 3,000 other armored vehicles and heavy equipment so far.
When did Russia invade Ukraine, and when did it do so?
Russian troops had invaded Ukraine from the north (up to 5 kilometers south of the border), according to a briefing by the Ukrainian presidential administration, and Russian troops were active in Kharkiv Oblast, Chernihiv Oblast, and around Sumy. Ukraine had also repelled an attack in Volyn Oblast, according to the press briefing. According to the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, Russian soldiers were stopped in Chernihiv Oblast, a significant battle near Kharkiv was underway, and Mariupol and Shchastia had been totally retaken.
Is Ukraine a member of NATO?
After regaining independence in 1992, Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which was later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and formally established relations with NATO. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wrner conducted an official visit to Kyiv on February 22 and 23, 1992, and Kravchuk visited NATO Headquarters in Brussels on July 8, 1992. The inauguration of the Ukrainian Embassy in Brussels in September 1992, which served as a connection in interactions between Ukraine and NATO, was a significant event in the development of relations between Ukraine and NATO.
So, what did Russia get out of Ukraine?
Russia attacked and annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in February and March 2014. This incident occurred in the aftermath of the Dignity Revolution and is part of the larger Russo-Ukrainian War.
On February 22, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with security service officials for an all-night conference to consider supporting deposed Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in departing the country. “We must begin working on returning Crimea to Russia,” Putin said at the conclusion of the meeting. Pro-Russian rallies were conducted in the Crimean city of Sevastopol on February 23. On February 27, masked Russian troops wearing no insignia took control of Crimea’s Supreme Council (parliament) and occupied critical sites throughout the peninsula. As a result, the pro-Russian Sergey Aksyonov government was installed in Crimea, a Crimean status referendum was held, and Crimea declared independence on March 16, 2014. On March 18, 2014, Russia formally recognized Crimea as two Russian federal subjects: the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. Following the annexation, Russia increased its military presence on the peninsula and threatened to use nuclear weapons to cement the new status quo.
The annexation has been condemned by Ukraine and many other countries as a violation of international law and Russian-signed agreements protecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, such as the 1991 Belavezha Accords that established the Commonwealth of Independent States, the 1975 Helsinki Accords, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, and the 1997 Treaty on friendship, cooperation, and partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Following the annexation, the other members of the G8 suspended Russia from the group and imposed the first wave of penalties against it. The referendum and annexation were also rejected by the United Nations General Assembly, which adopted a resolution affirming Ukraine’s “territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders.” The UN resolution also “underscores that the referendum, which is invalid, cannot be used to justify any change in the status of,” and urged all governments and international organizations not to acknowledge or suggest Russia’s annexation. The United Nations General Assembly restated its opposition to the annexation in 2016, condemning “the temporary occupation of part of Ukraine’s territory, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the city of Sevastopol.”
The Russian administration rejects the designation of “annexation,” with Putin justifying the referendum as following the idea of peoples’ self-determination.
Is Crimea a Russian territory?
In December 2014, Russia withdrew its military from southern Kherson. Since 2014, when Russia took control of Crimea, the peninsula has been administered as part of the Russian Federation (except for the northern areas of the Arabat Spit and the Syvash, which were controlled by Ukraine until Russian occupation resumed in February 2022).
The process of integrating Crimea into the Russian Federation began just days after the accession treaty was signed: in March, the Russian ruble entered official circulation, and clocks were moved forward to Moscow time; in April, a new revision of the Russian Constitution was officially released, with the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol added to the list of federal subjects of the Russian Federation; and in June, the Russian ruble became the official currency of the Russian Federation. Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian Prime Minister, announced in July 2015 that Crimea had been fully absorbed into Russia.
When Ukraine lost control of the peninsula in 2014, it cut off the water supply from the Dnieper River, the country’s primary waterway, which supplies 85 percent of the peninsula’s freshwater demands.
Why are Russian tanks in Ukraine failing?
According to Oryx’s calculations, half of Russia’s tanks have been seized or abandoned rather than destroyed or damaged by the enemy. Experts attribute this to logistical difficulties and Russian soldier incompetence.
How many tanks do the Russians still have?
The US has provided Ukraine with thousands of Javelin anti-tank missiles, which have become the war’s most iconic weapon, but the stockpile is depleting. Ukraine has most likely received around a third of the United States’ stock. As a result, the US is approaching the point when it will need to decrease transfers in order to preserve adequate stockpiles for its own war plans. New missile production is slow, and replenishing supplies will take years.
Russian armored vehicles are plenty, but their supply of skilled crews and morale are dwindling. Will Ukrainian anti-tank weapons cause enough Russian combat losses before Ukraine runs out of its most effective anti-tank weaponry, resulting in a battlefield stalemate?
Javelinsthe Iconic Weapon
To recap, a Javelin is a single-person-carryable long-range guided anti-tank missile. With images of Mary Magdalene, called St. Javelin, clutching a weapon and even a Javelin hymn, javelins have become the war’s most iconic weapon. Out of the large range of anti-tank weapons that NATO and other countries are giving to Ukraine, this is the most advanced, capable, and expensive weapon. The US claims to have delivered 7,000 to Ukraine.
Despite having far higher firepower, Ukrainian forces, which are largely light infantry, have been able to overcome Russian mechanized forces because to infantry anti-tank weapons.
It’s worth noting that Javelins are the most capable and well-known anti-tank weapon system, but they’re not the most common. The NLAW, an anti-tank system with guidance but not as advanced as a Javelin’s and with a shorter range, receives this honor. Other nations, such as Germany’s Panzerfaust 3 and Sweden’s Carl Gustav, have also contributed anti-tank weaponry.
Because the US has not released information on its Javelin stockpile, this must be inferred. Since manufacture began in 1994, total production has been 37,739, according to Army budget records. Every year, several missiles are used for training and testing by US military. As a result, the stockpiles may only have 20,000 to 25,000 units left. These 7,000 systems account for around a third of the total inventory in the United States.
That fraction may not seem significant; after all, two-thirds of the inventory is still available. Military planners, on the other hand, are likely to be concerned. The US maintains stockpiles for a range of potential global confrontations, including those involving North Korea, Iran, and Russia. Eventually, such inventories will be depleted to the point where military planners will wonder if the war preparations can be carried out. The United States is most likely on the verge of reaching that stage.
The obvious solution is to increase missile production (and launch units, the control box that goes on the missile). The US has been purchasing Javelins at a rate of around 1,000 each year. The maximum annual output rate is 6,480, though reaching that level would likely take a year or more. The delivery period is 32 months; that is, it will take 32 months for a missile to be delivered after an order is placed. This means that replacing the missiles that have already been delivered will take three to four years. If the US sends more missiles to Ukraine, the period to replace them will be extended.
It’s Not Just Javelins
Small weapons, tracking radars, and armored trucks are among the various systems provided by the United States (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle). However, the figures supplied are insignificant in comparison to expected inventories. The United States, for example, has given 50 million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine. That may seem like a lot, but the United States produces 8.7 billion rounds of ammunition each year for military and civilian purposes. Deliveries to Ukraine account for less than 1% of total deliveries.
The Stinger anti-aircraft missile is one system with limited supplies and replenishment rates. According to a White House fact sheet, the US has armed the Ukrainians with 2,000 Stingers. Since 2003, the United States has not purchased any. The overall production at the time was stated to be 11,600 missiles (from the FY 2000 budget documents). With a 1% annual loss in testing and training, the remaining inventory would be around 8,000 units. As a result, nearly a fourth of the US inventory has been delivered to Ukraine.
Manufacturing rates were stated at 275 with conventional shifts (named “1-8-5”) and 720 at maximum production rate in 2003, the last time the United States bought Stingers. The lead time for production was 24 months. It will take at least five years to rebuild the stockpile that has been depleted (two years for lead time and three years for production).
The issue is that the production line appears to be sustained solely by a tiny number of foreign sales, so ramping up could take longer than 24 months. Furthermore, the Department of Defense (DOD) is considering the next generation of short-range air defense systems and may not want to purchase more of what it perceives to be obsolete equipment. As a result, there may be a protracted period of risk if inventory is low and no replacement is on the way.
How Many Targets Are There for All Those Anti-tank Weapons?
The Russians have 2,800 tanks and 13,000 other armored vehicles (reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles) in units, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) The Military Balance, with another 10,000 tanks and 8,500 armored vehicles in storage, according to the IISS. According to open-source intelligence, the Russians have lost around 1,300 armored vehicles. In the end, the Russians are unlikely to run out of armored vehicles anytime soon.
If the Ukrainians eat up enough armor, the Russians may run out of skilled crews and morale. The Russians have lost roughly 40,000 troops, or about a fourth of their initial combat force, with their elite divisions suffering the most casualties. Some of the numbers can be restored with reinforcements and replacements, but skills are decreasing and morale, which has never been great, appears to be eroding. As a result, it’s a race. Will Russian combat losses lead to a stalemate on the battlefield before Ukraine’s most powerful anti-tank weapons run out?
Mark F. Cancian is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., where he works on the International Security Program.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt organization specializing on international public policy issues, provides commentary. It conducts neutral and nonproprietary research. CSIS does not take views on specific policy issues. As a result, all opinions, perspectives, and conclusions presented in this publication should be taken as purely the author’s (s).
The Center for Strategic and International Studies projects a date of 2022. All intellectual property rights are reserved.
What is the size of the Ukrainian army?
The Ukrainian Ground Forces, Ukrainian Air Force, Ukrainian Navy, Ukrainian Air Assault Forces, and Special Operations Forces make up Ukraine’s armed forces. Ukrainian Naval Infantry and Ukrainian Naval Aviation are part of Ukraine’s navy. The Territorial Defense Forces are a military reserve force that can be mass organized for civilian volunteers to assist in local defense in the event of a war. The Ukrainian Sea Guard is the country’s coast guard service, but it is part of the Border Guard Service and not the navy. From 1991 to 2004, the Ukrainian Air Defence Forces were a branch responsible for anti-aircraft warfare before being combined with the Air Force.
In response to Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, the president of Ukraine instructed the governors of Ukraine’s oblasts to form volunteer units under the government’s Territorial Defense Forces. Initially, these units got only a little amount of financing from regional budgets, relying primarily on donations. The majority of the territory defense battalions were absorbed into the Ukrainian Ground Forces in November 2014. The Ukrainian National Guard is a paramilitary reserve component of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Following hostilities with Russia in 2014, Ukraine expanded its armed forces to 204,000 troops (+46,000 civil servants), excluding additional units such as border guards (53,000), the newly established National Guard of Ukraine (60,000), and the security service. Ukraine’s armed forces will be the second largest in the region in 2021, after the Russian Armed Forces, with a total of 246,445 (195,626 military men). President Volodymyr Zelenskyy planned a 100,000-man boost in the armed forces by 2025, with conscription ending in 2024. Conscription will be replaced by intensive military training for a limited period of time.
Other countries’ military units have routinely participated in multinational military drills in Ukraine with Ukrainian soldiers. Many of these drills were undertaken as part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace cooperation program.